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Cohen and Porter: Integrity Attestation For Cloud

INTEGRITY ATTESTATION FOR CLOUD
ABSTRACT
A system and a method for integrity verification in a cloud through an attestation service
is disclosed. The system includes an application (app) or platform including an integrity
attestation service in the cloud connected to data centers and servers of the service provider. The
method includes collecting integrity measurements for an app or platform during run time by
combining multiple integrity statements to derive a final attestation verdict about the overall trust
level and attest an app or platform to be in the well-known security state. Another attestation
service may be used to verify the attestation claim and decide a cloud policy suitable for their
operation. The attestation service extends the basic attestation and sealing infrastructure per a
single node to support system-level attestation and sealing on the cloud scale. This is
accomplished without revealing the specifics of software stack and hardware configurations of
the nodes in the data center.
BACKGROUND
To adopt a public cloud based solution, customers must be willing to entrust their data
and applications to a public cloud provider. To be able to make this decision, customers have to
be convinced that their data and execution is safe, they are protected from various types of
attacks, and are ultimately in control of their applications and data. Trust is one of the core
enablers of cloud adoption and also one of the biggest reasons for customer concern.
Cloud service providers need mechanisms which provide and maintain the required
security assurances and offer customers the ability to verify them. The applications and the
underlying computing platforms will need to provide a certain degree of trustworthiness that
each of the cloud tenants require. In practice, the demanded transparency and trustworthiness
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may be accomplished and determined by verifying the integrity of the corresponding platform or
applications. A positive result from the verification implies that the platform or application has
not been tampered with, and hence, the critical application and information will not leave the
intended trust domains. To add to that, remote integrity verification mechanisms may also enable
an external party, such as a customer, to verify whether the platform or applications behave
according to their own security policies.
DESCRIPTION
A system and a method for integrity verification in a cloud through an attestation service
are disclosed herein. The system as illustrated in FIG. 1 includes an application (app) or platform
including an integrity attestation service in the cloud connected to data centers and servers of the
service provider.

FIG. 1: A system for integrity verification in a cloud through an attestation service
The method of integrity verification in a cloud through an attestation service is depicted
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in FIG. 2. Integrity measurements are collected during run time, starting from the virtual
machine (VM) boot process by computing a cryptographic hash of the initial platform state. For
this purpose, a hash (“measures”) is computed of pre-OS state and BIOS. A chain of trust is
established, if, additionally, both BIOS and bootloader measure the code they are executing as
well or a secure boot capability is enabled. The attestation claim combines multiple pieces of
integrity statements coming from different software stack levels including hardware-root of trust
presence, kernel modules measurements, VM secure boot state, VM image integrity state, VM
ID, VM geolocation, container trust level based on binary image signatures, container ID. These
measurements are presented to the distributed attestation service to derive the final attestation
verdict about overall system trust level. A set of standards for interoperability of the integrity
attestation claims for multi-cloud customer’s deployments may be provided. When the trust level
on the lower part of the software stack or the components that come before the VM (i.e., the
pieces over which customers may not have total control) indicate that the VM configuration is
not what was intended, the system will follow up with customers' specified policy. Such policy
may include launch VM, notify customer, or ignore (and relearn a new baseline). The VM or
Container that does not meet the expected "healthy" integrity state can be stopped from
launching based on customer's’ policy. In these cases, and if pre-specified as such, the machine
may be pulled out of the service and the customers informed that the machine is configured to
fail hard if it falls out of compliance with its intended configuration.
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FIG. 2: A method for integrity verification in a cloud through an attestation service
The cloud customers may use attestation service verification APIs to verify the attestation
claims and decide a cloud policy suitable for their operation. For instance, a customer may
release their high sensitive keys to VM only, and only if the VM is attested. The attestation claim
may be used by an ecosystem partner to decide on the set of operations they want to perform on
the cloud platform based on the integrity state of the underlying stack. Further, when a VM
attempts to read the data from the storage bucket, VM can continue to operate and will be
granted access only if it will present a verifiable attestation claim, otherwise the access to the
sensitive customers' data can be denied. The attestation claim may also be used internally to
mitigate some of the insider risk threats and concerns.
The attestation service extends the basic attestation and sealing infrastructure per a single
node to support system-level attestation and sealing on the cloud scale. Such a distributed
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attestation service design may be more applicable for cloud deployment. The system utilizes
configuration and policy management combined with strong integrity measurements to
implement and report integrity assurances of the cloud platform to the customers and root-inprod administrators. Under configuration management, customers are able to establish an
approved configuration of their usage and assess whether that configuration is currently
implemented. Under implementation assurance, each component provides a particular level of
assurance, and customers are able to verify that the components they rely on do provide the
required level of assurance.
The disclosed system and method offer a new control and transparency paradigm based
on higher security integrity assurance backed up by non-exportability and isolation properties.
The method combines multiple integrity statements, and the system authorizes access to cloud
resources based on attestation claims. Further, the method does not require guest agent
installations. For instance, a customer may obtain an attestation claim with regards to their
workloads with strong guarantees provided by the cloud provider about the platform integrity. It
offers a cloud attestation service that attests a system to be in a well-known security state. This is
accomplished without revealing the specifics of software stack and hardware configurations of
the nodes in the data center. It is ensured that customers understand the attestation integrity
assertion and reason about it with their own security officers.

Prior work:
1) Intel attestation service, built on the Intel proprietary EPID attestation scheme,
and target specifically only SGX enclaves ( CPU enforced trusted environments).
2) TPM attestation, the idea here is to attest the state of the TPM hw chip.
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